a list of recent work (with links)

For a full list of my publications, click here.

(forthcoming) “Why not weak retributivism?” a comment on Rejecting Retributivism by Gregg Caruso, for the Journal of Legal Philosophy.

(forthcoming) “Negligence and Normative Import: A reply to comments on Responsible Brains,” with Tyler Fagan, for a special issue of Criminal Law & Philosophy on the book Responsible Brains (Hirstein, Sifferd, and Fagan, 2018).

(forthcoming) “Neuroethics,” with Joshua VanArsdall, book chapter in Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introduction, under contract, Routledge Press (B. Young and C. Dicey Jennings, eds.).

(forthcoming) “Legal Insanity and Moral Knowledge: Why is a lack of moral knowledge related to a mental illness exculpatory?” book chapter for Agency, Responsibility, & Mental Disorder: Exploring the Connections, under contract,  Oxford University Press (Matt King & Joshua May, Eds.).

(forthcoming) “How is criminal punishment forward-looking?”, paper for a special issue of The Monist on instrumental theories of moral responsibility, (A. Jefferson and P. Robichard, eds).

(2021) “Philosophy Labs: Bringing Pedagogy and Research Together,” with Kit Rempala and Joseph Vukov, Teaching Philosophy: 44(2).

(2020) “Juvenile Self-Control and Legal Responsibility: Building a Scalar Standard,” with Tyler Fagan and William Hirstein, in Surrounding Self-Control, Oxford University Press (A. Mele, Ed.).

(2020) “Chemical Castration as Punishment,” in Neuro-Interventions and the Law, Oxford University Press (N. Vincent & Nadelhoffer, T. Eds.).

(2018) “Pretrial Detention and Moral Agency” with Tyler Fagan, in The Palgrave Handbook on Philosophy and Public Policy, (Boonin, D. Ed.), 11-23.

(2018) Responsible Brains: Neuroscience, Law, and Human Culpability, with William Hirstein and Tyler Fagan, MIT press.

(2018) “Are Psychopaths Legally Insane?” with Anneli Jefferson, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, special issue on psychopathy, 14(1), 79-96 (Jurjako, M. & Malatesti, L. Eds).

(2018) “Non-Eliminative Reductionism: Not the theory of the mind/body relationship some criminal law theorists want, but the one they need,” in Neurolaw and Responsibility for Action: Concepts, Crimes and Courts, Cambridge University Press (M. Patterson & B. Donnelly-Lazarov eds.).

(2016) “Unconscious Mens Rea: Responsibility for lapses and minimally conscious states” in Law and Neuroscience: Philosophical Foundations, Oxford University Press (D. Patterson and Pardo, M., Eds.).

(2016) “Virtue Ethics and Criminal Punishment,” in From Personality to Virtue, Oxford University Press (Weber and Masala, Eds.)

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