My newest paper, which examines Stephen Morse’s adherence to non-reductivism in light of his theory of legal responsibility, has been published in Criminal Law & Philosophy. The paper is near and dear to my heart, partly because in writing it I was forced to admit to myself that I am a non-eliminative reductivist. I argue that the best way to preserve mental causation, and thus responsibility, is reductivism, and I gesture at a few candidate reductive theories. I’ve been ruminating on reductivism ever since I wrote my PhD thesis with David Papineau, and I feel like the paper is a bit of a coming of age.
I was lucky enough to present the paper to Stephen at a conference on his work, and he had many helpful comments. Michael Moore and Tyler Fagan also provided fantastic comments on an earlier draft that helped me clarify my arguments.
Please feel free to contact me for the penultimate draft if you would like to read the paper and don’t have access.
Pleas and Excuses 